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I. INTRODUCTION
The law presents many occasions in which an individual‘s unique
constellation of traits and attitudes is expected to matter. Take, for instance,
the art of jury selection. Trial lawyers understand that different people often
interpret the same evidence differently. Conventional wisdom holds that
people with certain characteristics have certain attitudes and that these
attitudes affect their perceptions of a case. The jury selection process allows
lawyers to identify those characteristics and thus reject potential jurors who
they believe are least likely to favor their client. Many lawyers therefore
regard picking a jury as the most important step to winning a trial. 1 But
despite the emphasis on picking the right person for the jury, evidence
supporting the conventional wisdom that a skilled attorney—or even
professional jury consultants—can identify jurors who are likely to favor their
clients is spotty at best.2
Similarly, lawyers understand that calling forth certain concepts and
imagery can frame evidence in a way that affects how it is interpreted. Courts
forbid a prosecutor from comparing a criminal defendant to Saddam Hussein
or Adolf Hitler, for example, because it evokes passions and prejudices. 3
Essentially, a lawyer who uses such a rhetorical device seeks to activate a
particular set of knowledge structures and beliefs to influence the sense jurors
make of the defendant‘s actions, motives, and beliefs, a phenomenon that
psychologists call ―priming.‖4 Even the most despicable defendant should
compare favorably to notoriously evil historical figures, but the technique can
work to a prosecutor‘s advantage when it succeeds in reminding jurors both
that evil exists and that people—including this defendant—are capable of
monstrous acts.

1. Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1683, 1685 (2006) (noting that trial lawyers ―view jury selection as one key to winning their
trial‖); James W. Mehaffy, A Few Tips on Jury Selection: A View from the Bench, 63 TEX. B.J. 878,
878 (2000) (arguing that the best trial ―lawyers understand that, above all, jury selection is the most
important part of the whole process‖).
2. See JOEL D. LIEBERMAN & BRUCE SALES, SCIENTIFIC JURY SELECTION 77–78, 99 (2007).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 1 M.J. 235, 238, 240 (C.M.A. 1975) (comparing defense
witness to Hitler was ―inflammatory‖); Harris v. People, 888 P.2d 259, 265 (Colo. 1995) (reversing
conviction where prosecutor analogized defendant to Saddam Hussein because comparison
encouraged jurors to ―employ their patriotic passions‖ and brought to mind an image of ―a bully‖);
People v. Deasee, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 505, 507, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing conviction where
prosecutor referred to notorious mass killings during argument); Wright v. State, 609 S.W.2d 801,
804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (reversing conviction where prosecutor compared defendant to Jack the
Ripper and the Boston Strangler).
4. John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Mind in the Middle: A Practical Guide to Priming
and Automaticity Research, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY
PSYCHOLOGY 253, 259 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 2000).
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Thus, it makes sense that lawyers are concerned with individual
differences among jurors and with semantic priming of the jury as a whole,
even if lawyers use different language to describe these concepts. But another
less intuitive psychological phenomenon also bears on legal decision
making—mindset. Put simply, a mindset is a way of making sense of the
world. Specific situational cues make salient not only relevant knowledge and
belief structures but also congruent ways of thinking. As we describe below,
the mindset primed in the moment can have an important influence on how
jurors make sense of the evidence. Understanding how mindset priming
works makes clear that what matters is not only what people think, but also
how they think about it.
In this Article, we discuss the relevance of mindset priming for various
types of legal judgments and decision making. In Part II, we distinguish
mindset from semantic priming and review the psychological research on
mindset priming in non-legal settings. In Part III, we present the results of
two studies showing that priming different mindsets alters attitudes about
legal issues. In Part IV, we discuss the implications of these findings for other
legally relevant situations and propose further research.
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON PRIMING
Psychologists have repeatedly shown that activating or ―priming‖ a
knowledge structure in one context can influence judgments in a separate,
unrelated context.5 Once activated, a knowledge structure can affect how one
interprets subsequent ambiguous events to which the primed construct
relates.6
Conceptual priming involves activating concepts or mental
representations such as traits, values, norms, or goals that then serve as
interpretive frames in the processing of subsequent information. 7 Once a
concept is primed, other concepts associated with it in memory are also
activated. 8
Psychologists have most typically demonstrated this phenomenon using
an unrelated-studies paradigm, in which the experimenter primes a concept in
―Study 1‖ and then assesses study participants‘ impressions in a separate and
ostensibly unrelated ―Study 2.‖ 9 For instance, in one classic study,
researchers exposed participants to words relating either to the trait of

5. Id. at 258. For a review of research on semantic priming, see generally Jens Förster & Nira
Liberman, Knowledge Activation, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY : HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 201
(Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins eds., 2d ed. 2007).
6. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 4, at 258.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 259 (reviewing the studies).
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adventurousness or to the trait of recklessness. 10 Later, in what the
experimenter told them was a separate study measuring reading
comprehension, participants read a story in which the protagonist acted
ambiguously with regard to the primed trait, making it possible to interpret the
described behavior either as adventurous or reckless. 11 Participants who had
been exposed to words related to recklessness in the first task were more
likely to characterize the protagonist‘s behavior as reckless, and those
exposed to words related to adventurousness interpreted the very same
behavior as adventurous.12 Thus, priming concepts associated with certain
personality traits brought related concepts to mind when people were faced
with new information.
While content priming activates a concept or meaning structure,
cognitive-style or mindset priming activates a way of thinking or mental
procedure. 13 Mindsets can be thought of as a procedural toolkit used to
structure thinking. They tell us how to think and provide ways of reasoning
about the world. Mindsets—also called heuristics or naïve theories—tell us
how to process information to make sense of experience. 14 When a particular
mindset is primed, these previously stored mental procedures can carry over
to a subsequent task.15
One set of fundamental and particularly well-researched mindsets
concerns approaching positive outcomes and avoiding negative ones. The
behavioral activation-behavioral inhibition system can be seen as the most
basic conceptualization of this mindset.16 The behavioral activation system
activates in response to opportunities for rewards (such as sex, food,

10. E. Tory Higgins et al., Category Accessibility and Impression Formation, 13 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 143 (1977). For discussion of similar experiments showing
how semantic priming can affect how people perceive others, see Thomas K. Srull & Robert S.
Wyer, Jr.,The Role of Category Accessibility in the Interpretation of Information About Persons:
Some Determinants and Implications, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1660, 1660 (1979)
(priming traits of hostility or kindness affected how study participants judged the protagonist in a
story).
11. See Higgins et al., supra note 10, at 146–48.
12. Id.
13. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 4, at 265.
14. Norbert Schwarz, Situated Cognition and the Wisdom of Feelings: Cognitive Tuning, in
THE WISDOM IN FEELING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 144, 147
(Lisa Feldman Barrett & Peter Salovey eds., 2002).
15. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 4, at 266; see also Jonathan W. Schooler, Verbalization
Produces a Transfer Inappropriate Processing Shift, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 989, 989–91
(2002).
16. See Charles S. Carver & Teri L. White, Behavioral Inhibition, Behavioral Activation, and
Affective Responses to Impending Reward and Punishment: The BIS/BAS Scales, 67 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 319, 319 (1994).
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achievement, and success) and evokes reward-focused action.17 In contrast,
the behavioral inhibition system activates in response to threat (such as
punishment, pain, failure, and loss) and evokes vigilance to avoid harm. 18
Behavioral inhibition is not the reverse of behavioral activation; rather, these
systems are independent in the goals they implicate and mechanisms they
activate. 19 The focus one takes depends on whether attaining goals or
avoiding problems is the relevant goal in the situation; it clearly is adaptive to
be sensitive to situational cues as to which is appropriate in the moment. 20
Action is appropriate when there is the possibility of a reward and the
potential benefits of action outweigh potential costs.21 Conversely, inaction is
appropriate when threat must be avoided and potential costs of taking the
wrong action outweigh its potential benefits. 22
Behavioral inhibition can be thought about as a sort of automatic or preconscious vigilance, in which environmental cues set the course of ensuing
information processing. 23 Detecting threatening information tunes attention,
perception, judgment, and memory toward outcomes relevant to a threat.24
Detecting a threat means that all is not well; one should proceed with care
until assured that the threat is resolved. The automatic vigilance system
accomplishes this by directing cognitive resources toward potentially
threatening information. 25 Threat does not freeze action but rather redirects
focus toward reducing harm. When the threat subsides, behavioral activation
recurs—one can resume focus on achieving positive outcomes or rewards
without attending to the possibility of things going wrong.
Researchers have applied their understanding of these systems to the
domain of goal pursuit. When all is well, one can focus on pursuing goals;
when there is the possibility for harm or costly error, one must instead focus
on avoiding harm. This insight informs several lines of research on mindset.
For instance, self-regulatory focus theory posits that people pursue goals with
either a promotion or prevention mindset. 26 Someone with a promotionfocused mindset pursues goals with an emphasis on achieving ideals and
17. See id.; Jeffrey A. Gray, Brain Systems that Mediate both Emotion and Cognition, 4
COGNITION & EMOTION 269, 278 (1990); E. Tory Higgins, Beyond Pleasure and Pain, 52 AM.
PSYCHOL. 1280, 1281 (1997).
18. Carver & White, supra note 16, at 319; Higgins, supra note 17, at 1293.
19. Carver & White, supra note 16, at 319–20.
20. Higgins, supra note 17, at 1284–85.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Randy J. Larsen, Emotion and Cognition: The Case of Automatic Vigilance, PSYCHOL. SCI.
AGENDA, Nov. 2004, at 5, 5.
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id. at 5.
26. See Higgins, supra note 17, at 1281.
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attaining success, while someone with a prevention-focused mindset is
concerned with avoiding failure and satisfying duties. 27 The promotionfocused person is less concerned with immediate threats to safety and can
therefore process information more heuristically, with less attention to detail
than the prevention-focused person, who must attend more closely to the
environment to resolve potential threats.
Different moods operate in much the same way. A positive mood signals
that all is well and cues less effortful, heuristic processing; in contrast, a
negative mood signals that something in the current situation is not right and
cues more effortful, systematic processing to detect and fix the problem. 28
Inducing a particular mood therefore not only affects how people feel, but
also primes them to process information in a particular way. For instance,
mood can influence moral judgment. One researcher has shown that people in
a positive mood tend to make more superficial evaluations of someone
engaged in morally questionable behavior.29
Psychologists have gone beyond approach-avoid-based mindsets to
explore a variety of other mindsets and their influence on cognitive
processing. In one study, experimenters gave participants instructions
designed to cue either deliberative or implementation mindsets.30 A
deliberative mindset involves weighing the pros and cons of taking action,
while an implementation mindset involves planning how one will implement a
project once a decision to take action has been made. 31 After receiving the
instructions, participants completed unfinished fairy tales in what they were
told was a second, unrelated experiment.32 Participants primed with a
deliberative mindset tended to complete the story with characters
contemplating their next steps or seeking advice. 33 Participants primed with
implementation mindsets, in contrast, wrote about characters who
immediately took action without further reflection. 34

27. See id. at 1281–82.
28. Karen Gasper & Gerald L. Clore, Attending to the Big Picture: Mood and Global Versus
Local Processing of Visual Information, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 34, 39 (2002); Norbert Schwarz & Gerald
L. Clore, Feelings and Phenomenal Experiences, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY : HANDBOOK OF BASIC
PRINCIPLES 433, 436 (E. Tory Higgins & Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1996).
29. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral Judgment? An Empirical Test with
Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 16 (2005).
30. Peter M. Gollwitzer et al., Deliberative and Implemental Mind-Sets: Cognitive Tuning
Toward Congruous Thoughts and Information, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1119, 1120
(1990).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 1122.
34. See id.
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Other researchers have found that people can be primed to think more
readily about ways in which a situation might have turned out differently. 35
Study participants who were exposed to a situation in which an alternative
outcome almost happened engaged in more mental simulations when faced
with a new, unrelated situation.36 That is, thinking about how a situation
might have turned out differently in one context makes people more likely to
consider alternatives in another, a phenomenon that psychologists call
counterfactual thinking. 37
Mindset can also affect whether a person processes information concretely
or abstractly. For instance, distance—both physical and temporal—provides
cues about the appropriate level of processing of information. 38 People tend
to process distant objects and events abstractly—extracting the gist of a set of
data to understand its fundamental qualities and the interrelations among the
parts.39 In contrast, they process proximate objects and events more
concretely, with greater attention to detail and information specific to that
particular situation. 40 Importantly, abstract versus concrete reasoning relates
to psychological distance. That is, psychologically meaningful events feel
nearer.41 When the subject matter of a case is personalized, decision makers
feel it could have happened to them; they may then reason more concretely
about the evidence, taking details into account. Conversely, they may be
more likely to process information in a global way when the case feels
distant.42
Perceived power has a similar effect. 43 A perception that one has little
power prompts local or more concrete processing; a perception that one has
35. Adam D. Galinsky et al., Counterfactuals as Self-Generated Primes: The Effects of Prior
Counterfactual Activation on Person Perception Judgments, 18 SOC. COGNITION 252, 273 (2000);
see also Kai Sassenberg & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Don’t Stereotype, Think Different! Overcoming
Automatic Stereotype Activation by Mindset Priming, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 506, 511
(2005) (―[I]ndividuals posses [sic] a cognitive procedure allowing to exert control over automatic
stereotype activation. This procedure can be activated by priming a creative mindset.‖).
36. Galinsky et al., supra note 35, at 252.
37. Id. at 253–54.
38. Nira Liberman et al., The Effect of Temporal Distance on Level of Mental Construal, 38 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 523, 523–24 (2002).
39. Id. at 524.
40. Id.; see also Lera Boroditsky, Metaphoric Structuring: Understanding Time Through
Spatial Metaphors, 75 COGNITION 1, 1 (2000); Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal
Construal, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 403, 403, 418 (2003).
41. See Liberman et al., supra note 38, at 523–24; see also Boroditsky, supra note 40, at 1;
Trope & Liberman, supra note 40, at 403, 418.
42. Liberman et al., supra note 38, at 523–24; see Boroditsky, supra note 40, at 1; Trope &
Liberman, supra note 40, at 403, 418.
43. Dacher Keltner et al., Power, Approach, and Inhibition, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 265, 265
(2003); Pamela K. Smith & Yaacov Trope, You Focus on the Forest When You’re in Charge of the
Trees: Power Priming and Abstract Information Processing, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
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substantial power cues ―big picture‖ thinking. 44 Similarly, the focus one takes
in approaching a goal—either achieving positive outcomes or avoiding
negative ones—triggers a particular level of processing.45 A success-oriented
promotion focus cues abstract processing, while a failure-avoiding prevention
focus elicits concrete processing. 46
These studies address different psychological processes, but they illustrate
an important general principle: it is possible to prime not only the substance
of thought but also its form.47 In all of these studies, participants were primed
not with a particular idea, but with a way of approaching a task, which
affected how they made sense of the world more generally. 48 Taken together,
this literature suggests that situational cues can make salient particular
cognitive processes, which are then likely to spill over to govern subsequent
tasks.
Psychologists‘ work on mindset has the potential to offer tremendous
insight into legal judgments and decision making of all kinds, yet this research
has not been applied to legal situations. There is every reason to think that
various situational factors—such as how case materials are presented or the
manner in which jurors are treated—affect the mindset of legal decision
makers. Indeed, applying what psychologists have learned about mindset may
clarify otherwise opaque judgment and decision-making processes, such as
when two judges see the same legal issue differently or a jury reaches a
decision that appears contrary to observers‘ assessment of the evidence. In
the next section, we begin to apply this knowledge to the domain of legal
judgments and decision making, presenting the results of two studies that
demonstrate how priming mindset influences judgments about criminal justice
policy.

578, 578 (2006).
44. Smith & Trope, supra note 43, at 578.
45. Jens Förster & E. Tory Higgins, How Global Versus Local Perception Fits Regulatory
Focus, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 631, 631 (2005).
46. Id.
47. In addition to semantic and mindset priming, goal priming can affect cognition and
behavior. For instance, study participants performed better on an intellectual task when primed with
words related to achievement. John A. Bargh et al., The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation
and Pursuit of Behavioral Goals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1014, 1014 (2001). For a
review of goal-priming research, see generally Jens Förster et al., Seven Principles of Goal
Activation: A Systematic Approach to Distinguishing Goal Priming from Priming of Non-Goal
Constructs, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 211 (2007).
48. See, e.g., Förster et al., supra note 47.
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III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF MINDSET PRIMING ON LEGAL DECISION
MAKING
In two studies, we examined how priming a mindset focused on either
achieving success or avoiding failure influenced legally relevant judgments.
Both studies were approved by the University of Michigan‘s Institutional
Review Board and conformed to the ethical standards established by the
psychological research community. We provided informed consent to study
participants, randomly assigned them to experimental conditions, and
thoroughly debriefed them after the study.
We applied research about mindsets focused on achieving success and
avoiding failure to examine how activating these systems affects people‘s
approach to legal issues. 49 Specifically, we asked participants to think about
either achieving their goals or avoiding harms and then asked them to report
their opinions about constitutional protections for criminal defendants (Study
1) and about proper punishments for criminals (Study 2). We hypothesized
that priming a mindset focused on avoiding harm and mistakes would induce
in participants a more measured and cautious approach when considering how
to treat people accused of crimes compared to participants primed to think
about achieving goals and success. 50
A. Participants and Procedure
In both studies, we recruited participants on the web to fill out a criminal
justice system questionnaire. 51 They were directed to a website that explained
the study and their rights and solicited participation of those over eighteen
years of age. Those agreeing to participate were asked to click on a bar at the
bottom of the screen. The bar-click randomly sent participants into one of
three conditions. These were a no prime control and two priming conditions:
an avoid failure (―avoid‖) condition and an achieve success (―achieve‖)
condition. Study 1 included 82 men, 101 women, and 6 participants who
declined to indicate gender;52 Study 2 included 70 men, 161 women, and 2
participants who declined to indicate gender.53
49. See discussion supra Part II.
50. See discussion infra Part III.A for further explanation.
51. We posted invitations to participate in a web-based study about the criminal justice system
on many sites; according to a participant report in Study 1, the participants came from psychological
research (32.8%), current events (30.7%), hobby or other interests (6.3%), women‘s magazines
(4.8%), and other (25.4%) portals or online forums. In Study 2, participants reported coming from
psychological research (42.9%), current events (10.3%), hobbies or other interest (7.3%), women‘s
magazines (5.2%), and other (33.5%) portals or online forums.
52. Study 1 participants identified themselves mostly as white (76.2%, then about 5% each,
African American, Latino, and declined to report), Christian (57.7%, then 19.6% no religion, 14.3%
―other‖ religion, and 6.9% declined to report), young adults (48.1% 18–25, M = 29.6, SD = 11.29).
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To prime mindset, we asked participants to read from a list of actions with
accompanying photographs that reflected either taking steps toward achieving
a goal (in the achieve condition) or steps toward preventing harm (in the avoid
condition), and to select those actions that they had taken recently. 54 In the
no-prime control condition, we simply omitted the priming task. After
completing the priming task, participants answered questions about the
criminal justice system, followed by questions about demographic
characteristics and debriefing information.

They rated themselves politically conservative (17.5%), moderate (30.7%), liberal (24.4%) or other
(27.5%, including socially liberal but fiscally conservative (2.6%), civil libertarian (4.8%), not
interested in politics (15.3%), and declined to report (4.8%)). Our sample thus included a wider age
range, more males, and a somewhat more racially diverse composition than the student-based sample
that is the norm in psychological research. Samuel D. Gosling et al., Should We Trust Web-Based
Studies? A Comparative Analysis of Six Preconceptions About Internet Questionnaires, 59 AM.
PSYCHOL. 93, 97 (2004).
53. Study 2 participants were mostly white (77.3%; 5.6% African American, 5.6%
multicultural, 3.9% Latino), Christian (57.1%; 24.5% no religion, 10.3% ―other‖ religion); young
adults (M = 28.39, SD = 9.17), with political orientation of conservative (18.5%), moderate (25.3%),
liberal (33.5%), and other (22.8%: socially liberal but fiscally conservative, 5.6%, civil libertarian,
3.9%, not interested in politics, 9.9%, declined to answer, 3.4%). Gender and racial composition of
this web-based sample was comparable to traditional samples examined by Gosling et al., supra note
52.
54. In the avoid condition, participants read and selected options from the following:
Americans know that sometimes an ounce of prevention is worth a pound
of cure: Simple measures can save lives. Which of these measures have you
taken to ensure the safety and security of yourself and your loved ones? Choose
as many as apply from the following: (1) Gotten a vaccination; (2) Worn a
safety belt while traveling in a car; (3) Taken steps, such as washing your hands,
to avoid the spread of dangerous bacteria; and (4) Worn a helmet or taken other
precautions in leisure activities.
Each measure was presented with a picture depicting the activity in the caption. Participants were
then invited to ―tell us about any other preventative measures you have taken that were not included
in the last question.‖
In the achieve condition, they read the following:
Americans pride themselves on their initiative: Sometimes you have to
reach for the stars to achieve a goal. Please tell us about steps you‘ve taken in
your life to achieve your aspirations. Choose as many as apply from the
following: [They were then presented four captioned picture icons to click on]
(1) Taken on a challenge because it was what you wanted to do; (2) Worked
hard to achieve your ambitions at work; (3) Taken a chance to achieve your
dreams; and (4) Lived life for the moment.
Each picture was presented with a picture depicting the activity in the caption. They were then
invited to ―tell us about any other measures you have taken to achieve your aspirations that were not
included in the last question.‖
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B. Measures
In Study 1, we presented participants with five questions about their
opinions of the appropriate level of rights to afford criminal defendants.55 We
based these items on those used in national opinion polls. For instance, we
asked them how they felt about imposing a moratorium on the death penalty,
and whether people accused of crimes enjoyed too many or too few rights.
Some items had three response choices and others had four, depending on the
nature of the question. We also tailored the scale of the responses to the
questions (e.g., too many rights to too few rights, strongly support to strongly
oppose). We reverse coded as necessary so that higher responses always
represented greater endorsement of defendants‘ rights, standardized the
responses, and calculated the mean of all items. 56 The final score represented
a general affinity for defendants‘ rights, with higher numbers indicating
greater support.
In Study 2, we asked participants about the appropriate punishment for
various crimes, again modeling the questions on those used in public opinion
polls. 57 For instance, participants indicated what they felt was the right
punishment for murder and whether they approved of the extent to which the
criminal justice system punished violent offenders. Responses varied by
question. We reverse scored as necessary, standardized responses, and took a
mean to create a single score in which higher values reflected endorsement of
harsher punishment. 58
C. Results and Discussion
In neither study did participants‘ responses vary based on their gender,
race, or religion; however, political affiliation did matter. That is, those who
identified themselves as politically conservative favored granting fewer rights
to criminal defendants compared to other respondents59 and supported harsher
punishments for criminals. 60 Because conservatism bears on people‘s views
of these issues, we tested the effect of priming in both studies with an
Analysis of Covariance, which allowed us to control for the effect of political
conservatism. As predicted, mindset mattered over and above the effect of
political conservatism: compared to priming an achieve mindset, priming an

55. See Appendix 1 for all items.
56. M = 0, SD = .71 (after standardization).
57. See Appendix 2 for all items.
58. M = 0, SD = .67 (after standardization).
59. M = -.31, SD = .64 (self-identified conservatives) vs. M = .05, SD = .68 (all other
respondents), F(1, 175) = 7.31, p < .01.
60. M = .42, SD = .51 (self-identified conservatives) vs. M = -.08, SD = .67 (all other
respondents), F(1, 226) = 22.59, p < .001.
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avoid mindset increased affinity for rights61 and softened participants‘ stance
on appropriate punishment for criminals. 62
As hypothesized, priming a mindset focused on avoiding harm increased
participants‘ focus on protecting defendants‘ rights compared to priming a
mindset focused on achieving success. Although conservatives (in either
condition) were generally less likely to endorse defendants‘ rights and more
willing to punish, priming had a statistically significant effect even when we
controlled for conservatism. Priming to avoid harm increased the extent to
which participants endorsed support for the rights of the accused; focusing on
harm prevention seemed to prompt participants to consider the importance of
protecting against errors of commission. In the context of opinions about the
criminal justice system, that concern translates to guarding against the dangers
of an overreaching state that rushes to judgment and violates civil liberties. In
contrast, an achieve mindset freed participants to focus on attaining goals; the
goal in the criminal justice context is to catch and punish wrongdoers, which
translates into relatively less concern for avoiding mistakes.
In two studies, we primed a mindset focused on either achieving success
or avoiding failure. That mindset in turn affected how those participants felt
about criminal justice issues. Their personal characteristics still mattered;
political conservatives, not surprisingly, favored stronger punishments and
fewer protections for criminals in the first two studies. But mindset also
mattered. When faced with precisely the same issues, participants responded
differently depending on the mindset we had previously primed in them.
Priming a mindset focused on avoiding harm and failure made participants
more likely to favor protections from an overreaching state that punishes too
rashly and harshly compared to participants primed with a mindset focused on
achieving success.
These findings raise interesting questions that warrant further research.
We primed mindset in a seemingly innocuous aside, outside the context of
crime, by asking participants to report measures they have taken in their own
lives either to prevent harm or to achieve their goals, using non-crime-related
examples. That mindset then carried over to influence how they thought about
criminal justice policy in general. But would mindset have the same effect if
primed in the context of safety and avoiding harm related to crime? What if
we asked about appropriate punishment or procedural safeguards for
61. We tested this effect using planned contrasts between the two primed conditions, which
revealed a statistically significant difference, EMM (estimated marginal means) = -.05 (avoid) vs. .24 (achieve), F(1, 175) = 5.01, p < .05. Estimated marginal means are presented to account for the
inclusion of a covariate (political conservatism) in the analysis.
62. We tested this effect using planned contrasts between the two primed conditions, which
revealed a statistically significant difference, EMM = -.08 (avoid) vs. .13 (achieve), F(1, 226) = 4.07,
p < .01.
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particular wrongdoers rather than general policy? What if we asked
participants about the best way to treat an accused wrongdoer who committed
a crime against a personalized other? In these cases, priming may have had
different effects. Take the example of people asked to consider punishment
for a personalized crime after being focused on avoiding mistakes. In this
circumstance, people might become less tolerant of criminals‘ rights and more
willing to punish criminals because they would define avoiding mistakes in
terms of erroneously letting a guilty party go free rather than on avoiding
mistakes in terms of erroneously punishing an accused but innocent party.
As these thought experiments suggest, priming vigilance against harm
might in some cases induce a tough, law-and-order mentality. In context,
primed or chronically salient mindsets are likely to affect legal judgments and
decision making in complex ways—some obvious and intuitive and some less
so. In the next section we consider likely consequences of mindset for legal
judgments.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF MINDSET PRIMING FOR POLICY AND LEGAL DECISION
MAKING
In the previous section, we discussed two studies that showed that having
a mindset focused either on avoiding harm or achieving success affected
people‘s judgments about criminal justice policy. In this section we consider
how those mindsets and others could affect other types of legal decision
making and discuss common situations that might prime those mindsets with
potentially unintended consequences.
A. Achieve Success Versus Avoid Failure and Burdens of Proof
In a separate study conducted by the authors, participants read about the
police investigation of the shooting death of a convenience store clerk. 63 The
investigation focused on a prime suspect against whom police had gathered a
weak circumstantial case. Mindset was primed in the wording of the
instructions. Participants were instructed either to focus on making sure the
investigation succeeded or to focus on making sure it did not result in a
mistake. Mindset priming (achieving success or avoiding a mistake) did not
significantly affect participants‘ perceptions of the strength of the evidence,
but it did affect whether they advocated arresting him. 64 Participants primed
63. Barbara O‘Brien & Daphna Oyserman, The Shield of Defense or the Sword of Prosecution:
How Self-Regulatory Focus Relates to Responses to Crime, J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming
2009) (manuscript at 12, on file with authors).
64. Participants in the achieve-prime condition were 65.75% (SD = 14.57) certain that the
suspect was the culprit, while participants in the avoid-prime condition were 61.83% certain (SD =
17.05); the difference between these two conditions was not statistically significant, t(125) = -1.39, p
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to achieve success did not find the evidence against the suspect to be any
stronger than did participants primed to avoid mistakes, but achieve-primed
participants were nevertheless more willing to take action based on that
evidence and arrest the suspect.65
This finding has implications for understanding how jurors interpret the
reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases. Many courts refuse to define
reasonable doubt when instructing jurors in criminal cases 66 because they
consider the phrase self-explanatory and worry that attempts to refine it will
backfire and make it less precise. 67 However, the current findings imply that
jurors can be inadvertently primed to employ different standards in judging
the sufficiency of the evidence. 68 This suggests that burdens of proof are not
static, self-explanatory concepts. Rather, what juries perceive as sufficient
evidence may fluctuate based on the salient features of the situation. The
framing of a jury instruction may emphasize the importance of achieving
success by doing justice,69 or the language chosen by an advocate in closing
argument may highlight the cost of making an error. The lab-based
experimental evidence we present here cannot resolve the question of whether
the subtle difference in language used that produced effects in those settings
would also produce results in a real trial. However, the possibility that small
language differences matter in setting the standard for important judgments
such as how much doubt is ―reasonable‖ certainly warrants further empirical
study.

> .10.
65. Of participants primed to achieve success, 71% were willing to arrest, compared to only
51% of participants primed to avoid failure, χ2(1, N = 125) = 5.15, p < .05.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1993) (admonishing that
district courts should not define reasonable doubt); United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th
Cir. 1991) (―This circuit has repeatedly warned against giving the jury definitions of reasonable
doubt . . . .‖); Grant v. State, 703 P.2d 943, 946 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (emphasizing that trial
judges should not define ―reasonable doubt‖).
67. See, e.g., FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 7TH CIR. § 2.07 (1980) (―The
Committee recommends that no instruction be given defining ‗reasonable doubt.‘‖); United States v.
Shaffner, 524 F.2d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 1975) (―[U]se of an instruction defining reasonable doubt
presents a situation equivalent to playing with fire.‖); see also Note, Reasonable Doubt: An
Argument Against Definition, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1955, 1955 (1995) (―[C]ourts should not attempt to
define the term in conveying the reasonable doubt concept to juries.‖). For arguments in favor of
defining reasonable doubt to jurors, see Timothy P. O‘Neill, Instructing Illinois Juries on the
Definition of “Reasonable Doubt”: The Need for Reform, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 921, 954 (1996).
68. See supra Part II.
69. See, e.g., H. Alston Johnson III, LA. CIVIL LAW TREATISE, CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §
2.01 (―Above all, the community wants you to attempt to achieve justice . . . .‖).

2008]

MINDSETS AND LEGAL JUDGMENTS

163

B. Counterfactual Mindset and Consideration of Alternatives
Considering alternatives induces a mindset in which people spontaneously
think about how things might have turned out differently. 70 Consider a case in
which the defendant argues that it was not foreseeable that his actions would
have caused the plaintiff‘s injuries. Jurors hearing the case must put
themselves in the shoes of the defendant and determine what would have been
reasonably foreseeable at the time of his actions. 71 If those jurors have
previously generated an alternative explanation as part of another task, they
may carry over that mindset to the task of evaluating what the defendant
should have foreseen given the information available at the time. If
generating an alternative outcome comes relatively easily, the jurors may be
more likely to conclude that the defendant should have foreseen the particular
consequences that came about from his actions. On the other hand, if
generating alternative outcomes feels difficult, they may be more sympathetic
to the defendant‘s failure to foresee the plaintiff‘s injuries. 72
Sentencing decisions present another way in which the generation of
counterfactuals may be relevant. Jurors in capital cases are often asked to
determine whether a defendant poses a risk of future dangerousness;73

70. Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Counterfactuals as Behavioral Primes:
Priming the Simulation Heuristic and Consideration of Alternatives, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 384, 384 (2000).
71. See, e.g., MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. CTS. OF THE 3D CIR. § 9.4.1
(2006) (―[I]f [plaintiff‘s] injury was caused by a later, independent event that intervened between
[defendant‘s] act [or omission] and [plaintiff]‘s injury, [defendant] is not liable unless the injury was
reasonably foreseeable by [defendant].‖) (alterations in original); ARK. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CIVIL AMI § 1003 (2007) (―A manufacturer of a [product] has a duty to give reasonable and
adequate instructions with respect to the conditions and methods of its safe use when danger is
reasonably foreseeable in its use . . . .‖).
72. But having a jury consider too many alternatives can have the opposite effect—making the
course of events that occurred seem inevitable. People use feelings of fluency to inform judgments.
That is, if something feels difficult, it seems less likely to be correct, but something that feels easy
seems right. It might be easy to imagine how the defendant‘s actions could have led to a different
result, but generating many alternative outcomes would usually be more challenging. Thus, a jury
helped to see just one alternative may come to see other alternatives as possible, but a jury asked to
generate many alternatives might find this task difficult and perceive the current outcome as the only
one possible. See Lawrence J. Sanna & Norbert Schwarz, Debiasing the Hindsight Bias: The Role of
Accessibility Experiences and (Mis)attributions, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 287, 287, 293
(2003); Norbert Schwarz, Accessible Content and Accessibility Experiences: The Interplay of
Declarative and Experiential Information in Judgment, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 87,
87–88 (1998).
73. See, e.g., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. CTS. OF THE
8TH CIR. § 12.08 (2007) (listing as a factor to be considered in deciding whether to impose the death
penalty that the defendant ―would be a danger in the future to the lives and safety of other persons‖);
WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL WPIC § 31.07 (1994) (instructing jurors in capital
cases to consider ―[w]hether there is a likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to others in
the future‖).
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similarly, when determining a sentence, judges in non-capital cases consider
the likelihood that a particular defendant will recidivate. 74 A defendant who
seems apt to repeat criminal behavior in the future is more likely to receive a
harsher sentence than one who does not seem to pose a danger. The easier it
is for the judge or juror to consider alternative outcomes, the more plausible it
should seem that the defendant will deviate from past behavior. In other
words, decision makers primed to generate just one counterfactual might
consider a defendant with a criminal history to be more likely to obey the law
despite past behavior, leading them to impose a less severe sentence. 75
A counterfactual mindset might also affect how appellate judges evaluate
the prejudicial effect of trial errors on criminal convictions. Courts are
reluctant to overturn convictions for technicalities and therefore deem some
trial errors as ―harmless.‖76 An appellate court considers an error harmless if
it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to
the verdict.77 In other words, the reviewing court determines whether the
same verdict would have been reached even if the error had not occurred; if
the court believes that the jury could have reached a different verdict but for
the error, the conviction cannot stand. 78
Harmless error review therefore requires a reviewing court to engage in
counterfactual reasoning. 79 Appellate judges must determine whether a case
might have gone differently if the jury had never been exposed to an
inadmissible piece of evidence, or if the prosecutor had not been allowed to
make an improper argument. The easier it is for the appellate judges to
imagine an alternative outcome, the more likely they should be to find that the
jury would have returned a different verdict but for the trial error. A
counterfactual mindset would enhance the facilitation of alternatives, and
might therefore make a judge less likely to find a trial error harmless.

74. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006) (requiring that sentencing judges consider ―the
need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant‖),
invalidated in part on other grounds by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005) (holding
that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not mandatory); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(A)
(LexisNexis 2007) (stating that sentencing judges ―shall consider the factors . . . relating to the
likelihood of the offender‘s recidivism‖).
75. See § 2929.12(A).
76. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946); see also Jeffrey S. Jacobi, Mostly
Harmless: An Analysis of Post-AEDPA Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Harmless Error
Determinations, 105 MICH. L. REV. 805, 805 (2007).
77. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
78. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
79. See David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can Constitutional Error Be Harmless?, 2000 UTAH
L. REV. 483, for a discussion of the philosophical problems presented by counterfactual analyses.
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C. Perceived Power
Power is associated with seeing the big picture; lack of power is
associated with focusing on details. 80 As the authors of one study on the
psychological implications of power explained, bosses have five-year plans,
employees worry about getting through the week. 81 As in the case of
temporal distance, what matters is perceived power. Depending on how they
are treated, jurors can feel powerful or powerless. They may feel like small
parts in a big process, but as a group, jurors actually have tremendous power.
Appellate courts largely defer to juries‘ findings of fact and assessments of
witness credibility, even though jurors are never asked to justify their
decisions.82 Consequently, they can choose to acquit a defendant who they
believe committed the elements of an offense when they feel that the law
itself or its application in that particular case would be unjust. 83 But no one
tells jurors of this power, and they may not perceive themselves as powerful.
Rather, many jurors report being intimidated by the process—they are
unfamiliar with the rules of trial, the judge seems omnipotent, and the lawyers
talk over their heads.84 If they perceive themselves as being in a position of
low power, that perception may affect how they process information—if they
feel that they lack power, they may focus more on the details of a case with
less attention to the big picture.85
A perception of power or lack of it could therefore affect decision making
in several ways. Decision makers who process evidence with greater attention
to detail may be better at following the evidence in a complex case—one in
which causation is not obvious and that requires an understanding of
statistical probabilities, such as in a product liability case against a drug
company where it is not clear whether the defendant‘s product caused the
plaintiffs‘ injuries. They may be less likely to rely on heuristics, hesitating to
80. See Keltner et al., supra note 43, at 265; Smith & Trope, supra note 43, at 578.
81. Smith & Trope, supra note 43, at 578.
82. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Russell, 181 F.3d 731, 738 n.6 (6th Cir. 1999) (―[T]he court must
defer to a jury‘s credibility determinations and resolutions of conflicts in testimony, weight accorded
to evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn from the basic facts to reach ultimate factual
conclusions.‖), abrogated on other grounds by Mackey v. Dutton, 217 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2000);
Johnson v. United States, 756 A.2d 458, 461 (D.C. 2000) (―In recognizing the jury‘s role in weighing
the evidence, [this court] will defer to its credibility determinations, as well as its ability to draw
justifiable inferences of fact.‖).
83. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243–47 (1999) (discussing historical justification
for allowing juries this power).
84. Diane Wiley, Practical Tips for Jury Selection in Civil Rights Cases: Bad Attitudes and
Other Common Problems, in 11 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL
HANDBOOK 15-1 (1995), available at http://www.njp.com/articles/PracticalTipsforJurySelection.pdf
(―[M]any jurors tell us they feel nervous and often intimidated, they are worried about being ‗crossexamined.‘‖)
85. Smith & Trope, supra note 43, at 578.
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conclude that where there‘s smoke there‘s fire, for instance, or to award
damages to a plaintiff simply because a defendant is unsympathetic or has
deep pockets.
Legal actors may inadvertently signal to jurors that they either have power
or lack it, with unintended consequences. For instance, some judges take
great care to make jurors comfortable by explaining courtroom procedures,
making sure they do not wait, and treating them with respect. Other judges
are less able to attend to jurors‘ comfort, leading those jurors to feel
powerless. Attorneys may also cue perceptions of power inadvertently. A
lawyer may emphasize in closing argument the gravity of the jury‘s decision
in an effort to motivate the jury to process evidence more carefully. The
lawyer may instead evoke a mindset associated with power, reminding the
jury that it, and no one else, has the power to decide, and thus induce the jury
to engage in less detailed processing. Whether such an argument would have
this effect is far from certain and requires empirical testing to know for sure.
But presumably most advocates seeking to motivate deeper processing of the
evidence would not even consider the possibility that reminding jurors of their
power could backfire.
D. Deliberative-Implementation Mindset and Criminal Investigations
When police officers investigate a crime, they must first figure out what
happened—who did it and why. But at some point in every case that ends in
prosecution, investigators must shift their attention from determining what
happened to proving it. That is, once they have identified a suspect and
developed a theory of the case, investigators must gather evidence to allow
the prosecutors to prove that case in court. This shift from investigation to
case building allows for action but presents a risk that investigators will
overlook new evidence that undermines their theory of a case. Evidence that
points to another suspect or calls into question the suspect‘s guilt may arise
later in the investigation, after investigators have psychologically committed
to a theory that the suspect is guilty. Understanding how investigators make
this shift and its consequences for how they search for new information
therefore offers insight into the investigatory process and for improving
accuracy of criminal investigations.
Deliberative and implemental mindsets appear to be at work in this
process. The task of choosing a course of action activates a different mindset
than does the task of implementing it. Thus, people who are still deliberating
on a goal process information differently than do people who take the next
step and begin to implement that goal. 86 In particular, people in a deliberative
86. Peter M. Gollwitzer et al., Planning and the Implementation of Goals, in HANDBOOK OF
SELF-REGULATION : RESEARCH, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 211, 211–12 (Roy F. Baumeister &
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mindset weigh information in a more even-handed and objective way than do
people in an implemental mindset, who tend to be more optimistic about their
likelihood of success.87 This makes sense; attending to the pros and cons of a
decision before committing to it allows one to choose the best course of
action; after committing to that goal, second-guessing that decision would
generally slow progress.88 In light of this research, it would be reasonable to
predict that an investigator who approaches a case with a deliberative mindset
would be relatively receptive to evidence that exculpates a suspect and
generally more open-minded about the possibility of other suspects; once that
investigator decides to pursue a particular culprit, he or she should show
greater bias and be less able to evaluate evidence objectively. Further studies
applying research on deliberative and implemental mindsets to criminal
investigations have the potential to reveal useful insights into how
investigators search for and interpret information, and how they may fall
short.
E. Mindset Fit and Persuasion
Mindset may also be relevant to likely success of persuasion attempts.
When an approach to working on a problem is congruent with current
mindset, 89 the approach feels more appealing than if the approach requires
shifting gears. Researchers have found that this fit affects whether people
find a message persuasive. In one study, participants primed to focus on
achieving ideals were more persuaded by messages imploring them to eat
more fruits and vegetables when that message was framed in terms of
pursuing goals and aspirations; in contrast, participants primed to be vigilant
in satisfying duties and staying safe were more persuaded when those
messages were framed in terms of avoiding bad outcomes. 90
Thus, framing a persuasive message to match the listener‘s mindset can
make that message seem more compelling, an obvious concern for any lawyer
who must persuade a jury to accept a certain view of the facts or a judge to
rule favorably on a point of law. Moreover, the potential for enhancing the
persuasiveness of a message could extend to other mindsets. For instance, a
listener in a deliberative mindset may find a message framed in terms of
weighing options more persuasive than someone in an implemental mindset.
Conversely, a listener in an implemental mindset would be more amenable to
Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 2004).
87. See id.
88. Shelley E. Taylor & Peter M. Gollwitzer, Effects of Mindset on Positive Illusions, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 213, 223–25 (1995).
89. For a review, see Joseph Cesario et al., Regulatory Fit and Persuasion: Transfer from
“Feeling Right,” 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 388, 389 (2004).
90. Id. at 391.
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an argument focused on the benefits of taking action. 91 Again, further
empirical research is necessary to know the extent to which fit between an
argument and the listener‘s mindset enhances persuasiveness in legal settings.
V. CONCLUSION
Lawyers intuitively understand that individual differences matter for legal
judgments and decision making, and that calling forth certain concepts can
affect how people interpret and judge evidence. But lawyers generally
overlook the influence of mindset on those very same judgments—that is,
they fail to consider how situational cues can prime a way of making sense of
the world that affects how people perceive evidence and receive arguments.
Ignoring mindset means neglecting the third piece of the decision-making
puzzle. Consider common situations involving legal decision making—a
judge ruling on an evidentiary matter, a jury determining the guilt of a
criminal defendant, or a police officer deciding whether to arrest a suspect.
The first piece of the puzzle is the individual decision maker—the person‘s
attitudes, past experiences, and motivations can affect how individuals
perceive and weigh the evidence. The subject matter at issue also matters—a
child molestation case may elicit different reactions than would a simple
negligence suit. The final piece is mindset—the mental procedure the
decision maker applies to the problem. Mindset bears on decision making in
subtle but potentially powerful ways; it affects whether one attends to details
or focuses on the big picture, whether one exercises restraint or rushes to take
action, and whether one readily generates counterfactuals or sees a given
outcome as the only one possible—to name just a few.
In unambiguous situations, mindset may be less central than in more
ambiguous situations. A murder suspect caught holding the bloody knife over
the corpse may not escape conviction because his clever attorney primed the
jury to exercise caution in its deliberations unless there are other reasons to
doubt that what seems to be really is. The effect of mindset should be more
clearly evident in close cases, such as when a jury must grapple with the
reasonable doubt standard or a judge must decide whether to go beyond
existing precedent in a novel case. In these cases, mindset could play an
important and underappreciated role in decision making. We have attempted
to show how this might happen by offering ways in which mindset could
affect judgment in a variety of legally relevant situations. Our integrative
review and new studies suggest that inducing a mindset focused on either
achieving success or avoiding mistakes affects how people view controversial
criminal justice issues, hinting at a larger phenomenon that warrants further

91. See Gollwitzer et al., supra note 86.
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empirical study. We offer hypotheses about other mindsets and their potential
effects in legal contexts as an appeal for further research in this largely
overlooked phenomenon.
APPENDIX 1
Rights of Criminal Defendants
1. How do you feel about the rights given to people who are accused of
crimes?
a. The legal system gives them too many rights.
b. The legal system gives them the correct amount of rights.
c. The legal system gives them too few rights.
2. How do you feel about the rights given to people who have already been
convicted of crimes?
a. The legal system gives them too many rights.
b. The legal system gives them the correct amount of rights.
c. The legal system gives them too few rights.
3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ―It is more
important to let ten guilty people go free than to punish one innocent person
for a crime that he/she did not commit.‖?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

4. Some people have proposed amending the Constitution to require that
everyone accused of a crime be accompanied by a lawyer during all
questioning by law enforcement officers. Would you favor or oppose this
change in the Constitution?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose

5. Recently, the governor of Illinois declared a moratorium on executions in
that state until the procedures surrounding the death penalty could be
reviewed. Do you think there should be a temporary moratorium or halt in the
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death penalty to allow government to reduce the chances that an innocent
person will be put to death, or do you think there should not be a moratorium
because there are already sufficient safeguards to prevent the execution of
innocent people?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Strongly favor a moratorium
Somewhat favor a moratorium
Somewhat oppose a moratorium
Strongly oppose a moratorium
APPENDIX 2
Punishment of Convicted Criminals

1. For criminals convicted of premeditated murder, which of the following do
you think is usually the most appropriate sentence?
a.
b.
c.
d.

25 years in prison
Life in prison with the possibility of parole
Life in prison without the possibility of parole
The death penalty

2. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ―If a gun is used
during a crime, the sentence should be twice as long.‖?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Strongly support
Somewhat support
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose

3. In general, how do you feel about the way the criminal justice system
punishes people convicted of drug offenses?
a.
b.
c.
d.

It treats them too leniently.
It treats some people too harshly, and others too leniently.
It usually imposes fair sentences.
It is too harsh.

4. In general, how do you feel about the way the criminal justice system
punishes people convicted of violent offenses, like assault or murder?
a. It treats them too leniently.
b. It treats some people too harshly, and others too leniently.
c. It usually imposes fair sentences.
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